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THE FUTURE OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
EDWARD J. SCINEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1986 was a landmark point in the history of United States
income taxation. The Tax Reform Act of 1986' changed the topography as
drastically as an earthquake. 2 Today's tax adviser is still sorting out many
of the subtle changes in an attempt to properly advise clients.
Among the more prominent changes wrought by the 1986 Act were the
following: a drastic lowering of the tax rates;3 an inversion of the individual
and corporate tax rates; 4 repeal of the tax break for long-term capital gains;5
revision of the alternative minimum tax, 6 which, when coupled with de-
creased regular tax rates, resulted in expanded applicability; a frontal attack
on tax shelters and losses;7 and repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. 8 In
effect the law broadened the tax base, reduced rates and assured the double
taxation of corporate income. The short-term effect was to encourage the
conversion of corporations into non-corporate, pass-through entities as well
as a search for new sheltering opportunities. 9 The old rules and plans were
either abandoned or drastically modified.
With the arrival of a new administration, 1993 is shaping up to be
another monumental year for tax policy. Congress is currently debating
President Clinton's budget and tax bills, which are likely to once again
redesign the tax landscape. Among the more interesting proposals are the
following: resurrection of the investment credit;' 0 a significant increase in
* Professor of Accounting and Director, MTA Program, Culverhouse School of
Accountancy, University of Alabama.
1. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
2. For an interesting discussion of the origins of the act, see JEFFREY H. BIENBAUM &
ALAN S. MURRAY, SHowDowN AT Gucci GULCH (1987).
3. I.R.C. § I (Supp. 1993).
4. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (Supp. 1993).
5. I.R.C. § 1202 (repealed).
6. I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (Supp. 1993).
7. I.R.C. § 469 (Supp. 1993) (providing passive activity loss rules); id. § 382 (imposing
limitations on net operating loss usage after certain changes in ownership); id. § 465 (limiting
losses to amount of investment "at risk").
8. I.R.C. §§ 311 (Supp. 1993), 331 (1988) & 336 (Supp. 1993) repeal the pre-1986 rule
of General Util. & Oper. Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), which allowed avoidance of
the corporate level tax on distributions of property.
9. For example, S Corporation elections and corporate liquidations provided tax relief
after the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
10. TREAs. DEP'T, SUMMARY OF THE ADMINsTRATIoN's REVENUE PROPosALs 5-8 (1993)
[hereinafter ADMMsTRATION'S PROPOSALS].
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tax rates;" potential inversion of the corporate and individual rates;
2
adoption of a substantial long-term capital gain benefit;' 3 and severe restric-
tion of certain business deductions.14 These changes will almost certainly be
exacerbated by the tax law changes necessary to fund health care reform.
The long-term direction of tax policy may be greatly affected by the
potential adoption of two radical proposals. The first is the adoption of a
value added tax (VAT). A VAT would operate, in all likelihood, as a
national sales tax. The second proposal is the integration of the corporate
and individual tax systems. This would eliminate the classical double taxation
that we are currently operating under and put the United States in line with
the rest of its major trading partners. Adoption of either or both proposals
would lead the United States into uncharted territory.
Given the magnitude of the prior tax law changes and the almost certain
adoption of significant future changes, it is almost impossible to predict
the future of partnership taxation. That does not mean there will not be
changes; it means that the scope and direction are unpredictable. This Essay
discusses various aspects of partnership taxation that Congress should
address and offers suggestions for improving the operation of Subchapter
K. Specifically, this Essay addresses the need for congressional examination
of the definition of partnerships, the dichotomy between the aggregate and




Code section 761 defines a partnership as ". . . a syndicate group, pool,
joint venture or other unincorporated organization .. .. ,,6 This is not so
much a definition as the statement of an antonym. A partnership is not a
corporation. Given this approach, it is no wonder that the majority of the
cases and rulings concentrate on the definition and classification of a
corporation.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (Code), defines a
corporation as including associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance
companies.' 7 The regulations focus on the term "association" and define
this word based on the six corporate characteristics enumerated by the
11. Id. at 32-35, 44.
12. Compare id. at 32-35 (proposing increase in top individual rate from 31% to 36%,
and possibly 39.6%) with id. at 44 (increasing top corporate tax rate from 34% to 36%).
13. Id. at 11-12.
14. Id. at 40 (denying deduction for executive pay over $1,000,000); id. at 45 (denying
deduction for lobbying expenses).
15. Much of the discussion of the definitional problems is based on William B. Brannan,
Lingering Partnership Classification Issues (Just When You Thought It Was Safe To Go Back
Into the Water), 4 FLA. TAX REv. 197 (1993).
16. This definition is repeated in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1988).
17. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (Supp. 1993).
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Supreme Court in Morrissey v Commissioner.8 The six characteristics are:
associates, profit motive, continuity of life, centralized management, limited
liability, and free transferability of interest. To be classified as a corporation
the entity must contain over one-half the corporate attributes. 19
Within the definition and description of each of these characteristics,
there is a bias against classifying a partnership as a corporation. This bias
was included intentionally to restrict the pension benefits that the taxpayer
obtained in United States v. Kintner.20 In 1982, the pension law was changed
to remove the reason for the bias.2' The regulations, however, have not
been changed. 22
Although the regulations restrict the discussion to a resemblance test,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has attacked several entities based on
the general definitional requirement that a partnership may not be incor-
porated. 23 For this purpose, the IRS has used the broad common-law
definition of a corporation described in Dartmouth College v. Woodward.24
Even if the IRS is successful in proving that the entity is incorporated,
it is still possible to obtain partnership tax treatment. In Commissioner v.
Bollinger,25 the Supreme Court refused to tax a corporation on its generated
income where the taxpayer was able to show that the corporation was a
dummy acting solely as the taxpayer's agent. 26
As previously mentioned, the regulations, which were adopted in 1960,
have a propartnership bias, and the general incorporation question, discussed
above, is all but ignored. Therefore, a tax adviser should be in the position
of being reasonably certain as to the classification of an entity as a
partnership. Unfortunately there are still some lingering questions in relation
to limited partnerships. These arise in cases in which the entity contains
minimum equity, where the general partner is affiliated with the limited
partners, and where the partnership can be reconstituted following disso-
lution. 27 As a result, a tax adviser must be willing either to meet the IRS's
18. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
19. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983). Because associates and profit
motive are characteristics common to partnerships and corporations, an entity must have over
one-half of the remaining corporate characteristics to be classified as a corporation. Id.
20. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
21. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX TREATMENT OF MASTER LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS (1987), reprinted in DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), June 30, 1987, at J-1, J-3
[hereinafter MLPs].
22. In 1974, the Treasury issued proposed regulations reversing this bias. They were
withdrawn the following day. See Terrill Ann Hyde, Partnership-Statutory Outline and Defi-
nition, 161-3rd TAX MomT. PORT. 102-03 (1987).
23. See Brannan, supra note 15, at 204-05.
24. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (defining corporation as artificial being, invisible,
intangible, existing only in contemplation of law, and possessing only those properties which
its charter confers expressly or which are incidental to its existence).
25. 485 U.S. 340 (1988).
26. For an expanded discussion of this issue, see BoUs I. BrrnrcR & JAMS S. EusTicE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 2.10, at 2-33 to 2-37 (5th
ed. 1987).
27. For a complete discussion of those issues, see Brannan, supra note 15, at 207-08,
212-14, 238-39.
19931
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:517
extremely stringent requirements for an advance ruling or proceed without
any assurances that the proposed classification will be honored.
A. Publicly Traded Partnerships
A master limited partnership (MLP) is a limited partnership whose
interests are traded on an exchange or over the counter. 29 They are also
known as publicly traded partnerships to emphasize the trading of the
interest, the attribute which removes one of the main deterrents to investing
in any limited partnership-the illiquidity of ownership. The first MLP was
organized in 1981.30 By 1984, the number of MLPs had increased substan-
tially. As a consequence, the Treasury offered a provision that would have
classified limited partnerships with more than thirty-five partners as cor-
porations.3 ' However, this provision was not enacted.
One of the principle concerns generated by the rise in MLPs was the
"disincorporation of America. ' 32 The main fear was the erosion of the tax
base as entities subject to double taxation were replaced with a form of
pass-through entity subject to only one level of tax.3 3 It is not surprising,
therefore, that in 1987 Congress enacted Code section 7704, Certain Publicly
Traded Partnerships Treated As Corporations. 4
Code section 7704(a) provides that, unless excepted, a publicly traded
partnership is treated as a corporation. This section defines a publicly traded
partnership as one whose interests are traded on a securities market or are
readily tradable on a secondary market or its equivalent. 3 The section
attacks partnerships that are marketable rather than all large partnerships
as in the original 1984 proposal. The reason for the change was that the
trading of the interests, not just size, makes these entities almost indistin-
guishable from corporations. It is relatively easy to determine if the interests
are traded on a securities mitrket or secondary market. The real question
is what are the equivalent transactions? The Treasury position is that the
equivalent of a secondary market exists if a person is standing ready to
make a market. 6 This can take the form of a general partner willing to
either purchase the interest or provide a clearinghouse for trading infor-
mation.
Excepted from corporate classification are partnerships with passive type
income. 37 Passive type income is defined to include interest, dividends, real
28. Rev. Procs. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735, 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438, 75-16, 1975-1 C.B. 696,
and 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798.
29. MLPs, supra note 21, at J-6.
30. ARTHuR B. WnHus E AL., PARTNERSHiP TAxATION 535.01, at 35-2 n.1 (4th ed. 1989).
31. 1 TREAs. DEP'T, TAx REFORM FOR FARnES, SmPucrry, AND ECONO/IC GROWTH
120 (1984).
32. See Laura Saunders, America Disincorporated, FoRBEs, June 16, 1986, at 74.
33. MLPs, supra note 21, at J-7.
34. Revenue Act of 1987 § 10211(a), 26 U.S.C. § 7704 (1988).
35. I.R.C. § 7704(b) (1988).
36. I.R.C. Notice 88-75, 1988-2 C.B. 386.
37. I.R.C. § 7704(c) (1988).
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property rents, income from natural resources, capital gains from property
used to generate passive income, and certain commodity and futures trans-
actions.38 To be excepted, the partnership must receive ninety percent or
more of its gross income from the types of income on the qualifying list.3 9
In effect, the law exempts those MLPs that created the concerns 4
0
B. Large Partnerships
The Tax Simplification Act of 199141 contained a number of provisions
aimed directly at large partnerships. The stated reason for the proposal was
to restrict the burden that normal partnership reporting placed on small
investors. The burden results directly from the fact that a typical K-1 form
from a large partnership may have over forty entries that each investor
must decipher and report. The proposal was also designed to aid the IRS,
which has substantial difficulty matching K-1 information to individual tax
returns and then auditing these returns.
Although not mentioned, it is interesting to speculate concerning the
extent that the required partnership tax year changes included in the 1986
and 1987 Tax Acts exacerbated the stated problems. These Acts changed
the allowable tax years for partnerships such that most large partnerships
are on a calendar year. 42 The result is that the K-is are not due until April
fifteenth, almost automatically guaranteeing that investors will file extended
returns. This is difficult on the taxpayer, his or her adviser, as well as the
IRS, which receives more returns in a shorter time period. Many practitioner
groups objected to the tax year changes for these reasons. It is ironic and
troublesome if the practitioners were accurate and Congress, rather than
reversing itself, is planning on correcting the problem by adding additional
rules and layers of complexity to an already complex subject.
One of the most significant changes to partnership taxation as applied
to large partnerships proposed by the 1991 Act was to restrict the flow-
through of income and deductions from the partnership to the partners. 43
Instead of all items flowing through, the only items that would have been
reported on the partners' individual returns are passive income or loss,
other income or loss, capital gains and losses, alternative minimum tax
adjustments, and credits. In addition to restricting the reporting, the pro-
posal would have limited charitable contributions at the partnership level
and disallowed seventy percent of all items which qualified as miscellaneous
itemized deductions." Finally, the proposal would have made the deferred
38. I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1) (1988).
39. I.R.C. § 7704(c)(2) (1988).
40. These partnerships, although outside I.R.C. § 7704, may be subject to special rules
under I.R.C. § 469. This change was designed to prevent the MLP from functioning as a
passive income generator.
41. H.R. 2777, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1394, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
42. I.R.C. § 706 (Supp. 1993).
43. H.R. 2777, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1991).
44. Id.
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sale method the mandatory method for purposes of the Code section 704(c)
adjustment.
45
The proposed change in the law was to apply solely to large partnerships,
which the Act defined as a partnership with more than 250 partners. 46 Once
classified as a large partnership, the entity would retain this classification
unless the number of partners declined to fewer than 100. There was an
exception for any partner who owned more than five percent of the
partnership and materially participated in management.
The proposal, in effect, would elevate the entity and downplay the
partners. It is very reminiscent of the rules that applied to S Corporations
before the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1980.47 The proposal has been
criticized as restricting the application of good tax theory without substan-
tially reducing the administrative burdens that the theory imposes.
The Tax Simplification Act of 1991 never became law. Instead these
large partnership provisions were included in the 1992 Tax Act .4 This act
was vetoed, preventing the proposals from becoming law. However, it is
reasonable to assume that we will see these proposals again.
C. Limited Liability Companies
A partnership, even a limited partnership, suffers from a serious draw-
back in the minds of investors and owners-unlimited liability. As court
judgments and settlements have reached stratospheric heights followed closely
by insurance premiums, many partners have sought limitation of these risks.
For many, the bright star on the horizon is the limited liability company
(LLC). For those parties forming LLCs, the hope is that these entities will
provide limited liability while still providing partnership tax treatment for
the income.
To obtain the expected tax treatment, the LLC must meet the tax
definition of a partnership. Based on the resemblance test from the regu-
lations, the entity may not have more than one-half of the four relevant
characteristics-limited liability, centralized management, free transferability
of interest, and continuity of life. 49 Because the entity has limited liability
by definition, it cannot have two of the other three corporate characteristics.
Most commentators assume that it is relatively straightforward to accomplish
this structure.5 0 However, it may not be as simple as it seems. As Brannan
points out, to lack centralized management the entity must be organized
45. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (Supp. 1993) (requiring contributing partner to recognize pre-
contribution gain on partnership's disposal of property).
46. H.R. 2777, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1991).
47. Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982).
48. Tax Fairness and Economic Growth Act of 1992, H.R. 4210, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
subtitle C (1992).
49. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983).
50. See, e.g., Charles E. Price, Tax Aspects of Limited Liability Companies, 174 J.
AccT. 48 (1992).
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under a Discretionary Delegation Statute." If this is not available or
unacceptable to the owners, the owners must be willing to give up free
transferability and be willing to allow the entity to dissolve on the death
or bankruptcy of any of the owners. Even if the LLC lacks centralized
management, it must also lack one of the other two attributes. These choices
may not be palatable to many owners.
Based on the above, Brannan concludes that the problems will "...
confine the use of limited liability companies to the closely held and personal
service business contexts. ' 52 I am not certain that either of these problems
is insurmountable or that limiting the LLC's use to closely held and personal
service businesses is much of a restriction. At the present time, the uncer-
tainty of liability in states that do not have an LLC statute and the state
tax results are much more of an impediment to increased use of LLCs.
D. The Future
The preceding discussion has highlighted the need for a clarification of
the definition of a partnership. I expect it to be forthcoming. The exact
form of the clarification is harder to predict.
Given the stringent restriction currently in force against tax shelters,
the reasons for restricting the definition of a partnership have been reduced.
Therefore, I think that there should be a liberalization of the definition of
a partnership. The one exception should be the large partnership. These
entities should be treated more like corporations than partnerships. They
should have a limitation on the passthrough of income. In addition, trans-
actions between a partner and a large partnership should be treated as
occurring between unrelated parties. The rules that are finally adopted
should treat large partnerships similar to the old Subchapter S corporations.
As for the LLCs, the Code should allow full partnership benefits. This will
allow business persons to shield themselves from unlimited liability without
paying a second level of federal tax for the privilege. The result would be
that LLCs will be the fastest growing segment of the partnership market
absent significant tax reform legislation. Accordingly, tax advisers would
have to grapple with the aggregate-entity dichotomy (as modified by the
relevant LLC statute).
III. AGGREGATE VS. ENTITY THEORY
A. Background
For partnerships, early English common law adopted the aggregate
theory of viewing this type of business entity.53 Under this approach each
51. See Brannan, supra note 15, at 252-53.
52. Id. at 255.
53. See WaLi L. CARY & MELvIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 31-33 (6th ed.
1988) (discussing history of aggregate-entity dichotomy in partnership law).
1993]
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partner is treated as owning his or her individual share of each of the
partnership's assets. Transactions with the partnership are treated as trans-
actions with each of the individual partners. This approach is very cumber-
some.
Alternatively, a partnership may be viewed under the entity theory,
which treats the partnership as an entity separate and distinct from its
owners. When applied, this theory treats transactions with a partnership as
involving a separate legal entity without reference to the effect or classifi-
cation that would result if the transaction was with any or all of the
partners.
The original Uniform Partnership Act generally adopted the old English
common law aggregate approach with the entity concept restricted to a
limited number of areas.54 By using both theories, a conflict arose. Which
theory should be applied in the absence of specific guidance in the law?
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 incorporated both theories within
Subchapter K. The adoption of both was considered necessary to prevent
tax avoidance or inequitable tax treatment among the partners.
55
B. Specific Items
Code sections 701 through 703 illustrate the adoption of both theories.
Section 703 treats the partnership as an entity by requiring the partnership
to compute its income as if it were an individual. Sections 701 and 702
apply the aggregate approach by exempting the partnership from taxation
and then requiring each partner to report his or her individual share of the
partnership's income, loss, and deductions.
These sections also demonstrate that the partnership will be considered
an entity for computational purposes.5 6 There is no indication that this will
change. 7 In fact, this aspect of the entity theory of partnerships is being
reinforced. For example, Code section 6698 imposes a fine for failure to
file a partnership return on time. Code section 6221 provides that the
treatment of all partnership items will be determined at the partnership
level, and Code section 6223 provides that a tax matters partner will receive
notice for the entire group.
It is even possible for both theories to exist within the same Code
section. For example, Code section 743(a) provides that a partnership's
basis in its assets will not change following the sale or exchange of a
partnership interest-entity theory-while section 743(b) provides an op-
tional basis adjustment to modify the partnership's basis in its assets such
that they equal the partner's basis in his or her interest-aggregate theory.
Another example is Code section 707(c), which provides that payments to
54. Id. at 32. However, the REVISED Unzoaa PARTNERsHPm ACT (1992) moves closer to
the entity concept.
55. PAUL LITTLE, FEDERAL INCOmE TAxATiON OF PARTNERSH PS (Supp. 1957).
56. Michael Pusey, The Partnership as an "Entity": Implications of Basye, 54 TAXES
143, 147 (1976).
57. ARTHUR B. WiL~xs ET AL., PARTNERSHp TAXATION § 4.06, 4-7 (4th ed. 1989).
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a partner for services or capital will be treated as to an unrelated party,
but solely for purposes of sections 61 and 162-entity approach. Apparently,
a taxpayer is required to treat these payments under the aggregate approach
for all other purposes.
This duality of theory also applies outside of Subchapter K for trans-
actions that affect partnerships. For example, if a partnership debt is
forgiven, the partnership will compute the amount of forgiveness of in-
debtedness at the entity level.58 However, the exception, to recognition of
cancellation of indebtedness income based on bankruptcy or insolvency as
well as the attribute reduction is determined at the partner level, evidencing
the aggregate approach.59
Recent legislative and administrative decisions appear to be adopting
the entity approach to prevent tax avoidance. For example, there is the
enactment of Code section 707(a)(2)(A) and (B).
Section 707(a)(2)(B) provides that in those cases in which there is a
transfer of property to a partnership and a related distribution of cash to
the contributing partner, the transaction will be treated as occurring between
a partnership and an unrelated party. In other words, the contributing
partner will be treated as if he or she sold the property to the partnership
with full recognition of the realized gain. This is a very clear example of
the entity approach.
This change was designed to prevent sales from escaping taxation by
masquerading as a contribution of property followed by a distribution of
cash, which is nontaxable under Code sections 721 and 731. Specifically,
section 707(a)(2)(B) was designed to overrule the results in the Otey v.
Commissioner,6° Communications Satellite Corp. v. United States,61 and
Jupiter Corp. v. United States62 cases.
63
Code section 707(a)(2)(A) requires the partnership to treat the perform-
ance of services by a partner and a related allocation and distribution to
such partner as a transaction between the partnership and a nonpartner.
Once again the partnership is treated as an entity separate and distinct from
its partners.
The enactment of Code section 707(a)(2)(A) was designed to prevent
taxpayers from circumventing the capitalization requirement. For example,
a payment made to a general partner for organization and syndication
activities would generate a nondeductible expenditure at the partnership
level.64 However, if the general partner received a special allocation of
income and a related distribution of cash, the income reported by the other
58. I.R.C. § 61 (Supp. 1993).
59. I.R.C. § 108(d)(6) (Supp. 1993).
60. 70 T.C. 312 (1978), aff'd per curiam, 634 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1980).
61. 625 F.2d 997 (Ct. CI. 1980).
62. 2 CI. Ct. 58 (1983).
63. STAFF OF Tim JOINT Comm. ON TAXATION, GEERAL EXPLANATION OF THm REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984 225-26 (1984).
64. See I.R.C. § 709 (1988) (providing for treatment of partnership syndication expenses).
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partners would be reduced, resulting in the functional equivalent of a
deduction for the organization and syndication costs. By treating the trans-
actions as occurring between an individual and a separate entity, the
expenditure would be capitalized. The tax avoidance potential inherent in
the aggregate approach was nullified by section 707(a)(2)(A)'s entity ap-
proach.
Another example involves the contribution of property. Code section
721 provides that no gain or loss will be recognized when a partner
contributes property to a partnership in exchange for an interest. Code
section 723 mandates that the partnership take a carryover basis in the
contributed property. If a partner contributes an appreciated asset to a
partnership, then the unrealized appreciation will be shifted in part to the
noncontributing partners. To prevent this shifting of the gain to noncon-
tributing partners, section 704(c)(1)(A) requires that income, gain, loss and
deductions from contributed property be allocated to take into account the
difference between fair market value and basis at time of contribution. In
other words, the Code appears to adopt a pure aggregate approach to
contributed property to prevent tax avoidance accomplished by the shift of
unrealized gains, losses and deductions.
However, the Treasury recently issued proposed regulations under sec-
tion 704(c).65 One of the options available to taxpayers under these proposed
regulations is the deferred sale method. Under this method the taxpayer
will be treated as having sold the property to the partnership for its fair
market value. The partnership's basis will be cost, and gain, loss, and
depreciation will be calculated based on this cost. From the partnership's
side, the transaction will be taxed under the entity method.6 The entity
approach prevents tax avoidance by using fair market value as the basis for
the partnership and the noncontributing partners. Therefore, there is no
potential to shift either income or deductions.
Not all of the recent decisions have adopted the entity approach. As
previously discussed, cancellation of indebtedness income is determined at
the entity level. The exceptions contained in Code section 108 are applied
at the partner level. An exception, not previously discussed, is section
108(e)(5) which permits nonrecognition of the income provided the basis of
the property is reduced. This is known as the purchase price reduction
exception. According to section 108(e)(5)(B), this exception does not apply
if the taxpayer is insolvent or in bankruptcy. In Revenue Procedure 92-92,
the Treasury concluded that a partnership can avail itself of the purchase
65. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,345 (1992).
66. The contributing partner will continue to use the aggregate approach. His or her
basis in the partnership interest will still be substituted basis under Code section 722. The gain
or loss generated by the hypothetical sale to the partnership is deferred until the asset is
disposed or it is depreciated, thereby generating an increased deduction for the noncontributors.
In effect, the proposed regulations permit a combined entity/aggregate approach to a single
transaction.
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price reduction exception regardless of its insolvency or bankruptcy. 67 The
only restriction is that the partners cannot take inconsistent positions on
their individual returns. Although it is not a perfect example, the revenue
procedure adopts a form of the aggregate approach. It disregards the
financial position of the entity. It is likely that it did not adopt a pure
aggregate approach because of the administrative complexities of having the
partnership treat segments of the cancellation of debt income as purchase
price reductions based on the financial position of each individual partner.
The procedure rejects the entity approach by ignoring the position of the
partnership. The result is a procedure which reaches its conclusion from an
aggregate approach perspective.
A more obvious example of the adoption of the aggregate approach to
partnership taxation appears in Proposed Regulation 1.1374-4(h)(5). Under
this regulation, a corporation that owns an interest in a partnership at the
time it becomes an S corporation will be treated as owning a proportionate
share of each of the partnership's assets. The built-in gains (BIG) tax will
be assessed against the S corporation on each sale or exchange of an asset
by the partnership. To have treated the partnership as an entity would result
in the imposition of the BIG tax in the above case solely upon the S
corporation's sale of its interest. By adopting the aggregate approach, the
regulations prevent avoidance of the BIG tax.6
C. The Future
Both the aggregate and entity theories were incorporated into partnership
taxation from the very beginning. Both should be there at the end. In the
future we should receive continued guidance on which theory to apply to
which transaction. It would be intellectually soothing to advocate the
adoption of one theory over the other. However, I believe a mixture of
theories will continue to be necessary to achieve fair and consistent results
with respect to partnership transactions. As McKee states:
Unfortunately, it is far easier to criticize the mixture of these theories
in the existing statute than to envision an acceptable statutory
alternative to avoid the blending of these incompatible concepts.
Neither a pure entity nor a pure aggregate approach seems appro-
priate for the taxation of partners and partnerships because in fact,
a partnership is a hybrid creature under state law, neither entirely
fish nor entirely fowl. Rather, what seems needed in the statutory
scheme is a clear indication as' to which of these theories controls
the resolution of doubtful questions with respect to certain broad
categories of transactions. 69
67. 1992-46 I.R.B. 34.
68. For similar rules if the partnership is created after the S election is made, see Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1374-4(h)(7), 57 Fed. Reg. 57,971, 57,976 (1992).
69. WnIAm S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
1.02, at 1-8 (2d ed. 1990).
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IV. PARTNERSHIP TRANSACTIONS
While Congress should not attempt a major overhaul of the theoretical
underpinnings of Subchapter K, there are numerous discrete partnership
issues that call for resolution. With time, many of these questions will be
resolved. Rather than trying to identify each of them, I will cover the basic
questions under the broad general headings of formation, losses and shelters,
and sales and distribution.
A. Formation
As previously discussed, the transfer of property to a partnership in
exchange for an interest is nontaxable. 70 The partnership takes a carryover
basis in the assets7' and the partner uses a substituted basis for his or her
interest in the partnership. 72 This relatively straightforward rule has been
complicated by a very ambiguous regulation which states:
To the extent that any of the partners gives up any part of his
right to be repaid his contribution (as distinguished from a share
in partnership profits) in favor of another partner as compensation
for services (or in satisfaction of an obligation), section 721 does
not apply.7
At the time the regulation was written, most commentators assumed it
meant that the receipt of a capital interest for services was a taxable
transaction, whereas the receipt of a profits interest was not. This assump-
tion was challenged in Diamond v. Commissioner.74 In this case the courts
held that Sol Diamond had ordinary income upon receipt of the profits
interest. The facts are somewhat unique and therefore distinguishable.
The Treasury did not lessen the confusion created by Diamond by
issuing proposed regulations in 1971. These regulations repeat the above
quoted sentence. 75 They then state that if the partner receives a capital
interest for services, the transfer shall be treated as a transfer of property
under Code section 83. The regulations do not mention a profits interest
except in the quoted parenthetical phase. These regulations have never been
finalized.
Recently, the Tax Court again addressed the issue in the extremely
interesting case of Campbell v. Commissioner.76 First, it should never have
been litigated since the Treasury had previously indicated that it would not
70. I.R.C. § 721 (1988). There is an exception for investment partnerships under I.R.C.
§ 721(b).
71. I.R.C. § 723 (1988).
72. I.R.C. § 722 (1988).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956).
74. 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
75. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1, 36 Fed. Reg. 10,987 (1971).
76. 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 943 F.2d 815 (8th
Cir. 1991).
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litigate this issue.77 Second, after winning in the Tax Court, the government
requested that the Court of Appeals reverse its victory. The Court refused
to honor this request. It held that the receipt of a profits interest is taxable
but because the interest in Campbell was speculative it had a zero value.
78
Campbell does not resolve the issue. Recently, the Treasury issued
Revenue Procedure 93-27,' 9 which should end the majority of the contro-
versy. This procedure holds that the receipt of a profits interest for services
as a partner or in anticipation of being a partner will not be treated as a
taxable event. The three exceptions are (1) if the profits interest is received
in a partnership with a substantially certain and predictable income stream,
(2) if the interest is sold within two years of receipt, and (3) if the interest
is a limited partnership interest in a publicly traded partnership. 0 Given a
reasonable interpretation of this revenue procedure, the issue should dis-
appear.
The quoted regulation contains two parenthetical phrases. The first
addresses the profits interest. The second has received significantly less
attention. However, it is equally important. The question raised in the
second parenthetical is the tax result of the receipt of a partnership interest
in exchange for the cancellation of a partnership debt.
It has been suggested that the regulation should be interpreted to mean
that the receipt of an interest in exchange for the cancellation of a debt
arising from a property transfer is nontaxable, whereas a debt arising from
the performance of services is taxable.81 This is not the only interpretation.
It is possible to read the regulation to mean all cancellations are taxable.
Section 108(e)(7)(E) provides support for the position that a creditor is
entitled to a bad debt deduction upon receipt of a partnership interest worth
less than a forgiven debt. In these cases, it is logical to assume that the
partnership has forgiveness of indebtedness income.
The entire question of forgiveness of debt needs to be resolved. Given
the current economic downturn, the question will certainly continue to arise.
It is reasonable to expect that the Treasury will address this issue and
provide guidance in the near future.
One issue appears close to resolution. As previously mentioned, Code
section 704(c) requires a partnership to allocate income, deductions, and so
on, to take into account the difference between the value of contributed
property and its basis at time of contribution. The methodology for handling
this difference was open to question. The recently issued proposed regula-
tions give taxpayers several options.82 The difference can be eliminated
through the traditional method with the ceiling rule, the traditional method
77. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 23, 1975).
78. Campbell v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 815 (1991).
79. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-24 I.R.B. -.
80. Id.
81. W. Eugene Seago & Caroline D. Strobel, Cancellation of Indebtedness in Exchange
for a Partnership Interest, 19 TAx ADVISER 443 (1988).
82. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(1), 57 Fed. Reg. 61,348 (1992).
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with curative allocations to offset the ceiling rule, or under the deferred
sale method. This flexibility will aid taxpayers and is a very promising sign
that the Treasury will avoid issuing regulations that act as a straitjacket in
the future.
The proposed regulations provide that in addition to applying to the
contribution of property, the rules apply in cases of capital account reval-
uation under Code section 704(b), also known as "reverse 704(c)" alloca-
tions. According to the section 704(b) regulations, these revaluations occur
when a new partner contributes cash to a partnership that owns appreciated
or depreciated property.83 It can be argued that the "reverse (c)" allocations
are beyond the scope of the Code section. Their inclusion may be defensible
on the grounds that they prevent significant tax avoidance potential. Re-
gardless of the final decision relating to the "reverse (c)" allocations, the
Treasury should be commended for issuing readable and reasonable regu-
lations.
B. Losses and Shelters
Each partner reports his or her share of partnership income or loss on
his or her individual tax return.84 If it is a loss, the deductible amount is
limited to the partner's outside basis.85 Any excess is carried forward.
This simple rule provided the mechanism for the tax shelter industry.
Although losses are limited to basis, this basis amount is increased by a
partner's share of the partnership liabilities.86 For recourse liabilities the
reason is easily defensible. However, the increase for nonrecourse liabilities
provided current deductions without the offsetting personal risk.87 It was
these deductions without risk that drew taxpayers seeking to shelter other
income from taxation.
88
If it were possible to eliminate these nonrecourse liabilities from outside
basis, the general rule would work reasonably well. However, given the
Supreme Court's decision in Crane v. Commissioner,89 this is not likely to
happen.
The problem was exacerbated by a simple rule in the regulations that
authorized allocation of the nonrecourse debt based on the partners' profit
shares.90 This simple rule was subject to manipulation, as evidenced by
Raphan v. United States.9' Congress' response was section 79 of the 1984
Deficit Reduction Act which charged Treasury with issuing new section 752
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f) (as amended in 1991). There are other transactions
that trigger revaluations as well as stated restrictions.
84. I.R.C. § 701 (1988).
85. I.R.C. § 704(d) (1988).
86. I.R.C. § 752(a) (1988).
87. The present value of the phantom income recognized upon the reduction of these
liabilities, while substantial, may not fully offset the present value of the current deductions.
88. See Stephen G. Utz, Partnership Taxation in Transition: Of Form, Substance, and
Economic Risk, 43 TAx LAw. 693, 694 (1990) (describing tax shelter incentives).
89. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956) (allocating recourse partnership liabilities to general
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regulations to override Raphan.9 In the interim Congress enacted Code
sections 465 and 469.
Code section 465 was designed to eliminate the deduction of artificial
losses. It limits a taxpayer's deduction to the amount he or she has at risk
in the activity.93 This limit is in addition to the basis limit of Code section
704(d).
A taxpayer's amount at risk is equal to the money and adjusted basis
of property contributed plus amounts borrowed for which taxpayer is
personally liable or for which property outside the activity has been pledged.
94
In effect, nonrecourse loans do not generate amounts at risk and, therefore,
do not generate artificial losses. 95
In spite of Code sections 704(d) and 465, Congress decided that tax-
payers were still deducting tax shelter losses. Therefore, in 1986 they enacted
Code section 469 which limits the amount of passive activity losses that are
deductible against nonpassive income. This limit applies to those losses
which survive the limitations of section 704(d) and 465.
A passive activity is defined as an activity involving an active business
in which the partner does not materially participate.9 In other words, the
definition looks at both the partnership and the partner. The partnership
must be actively conducting a trade or business. An investment partnership
would generate portfolio income and be outside the scope of Section 469.
If the partnership is engaged in an active business, the inquiry switches to
the partner. Does the partner materially participate in the activity? To be
a material participant, the taxpayer must be involved in the operations of
the business on a regular, continuous and substantial basisY7 A limited
partner would not be a material participant except as necessary to prevent
tax avoidance. 98 Because the definition includes both the activities of the
partnership and the partner, it is possible that section 469 will apply to
some but not all of the partners.
Losses derived from a passive activity are deductible only to the extent
of taxpayer's passive activity income for the year.9 Excess losses are carried
forward and treated as a passive loss in the following year.' °
partners based on their loss sharing percentages, and nonrecourse partnership liabilities to both
limited and general partners based on their profit sharing percentage).
91. 3 CL. Ct. 457 (1983) (allowing allocation of guaranteed nonrecourse debt to limited
partners even though debt was, in substance, recourse due to guarantee), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
92. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 597 (1984).
93. I.R.C. § 465(a) (Supp. 1993).
94. I.R.C. § 465(b) (1988).
95. There is an important exception for qualified nonrecourse financing issued in real
estate activities. I.R.C. § 465(b)(6) (1988).
96. I.R.C. § 469(c) (Supp. 1993). A passive activity is not limited to activities conducted
in partnership form.
97. I.R.C. § 469(h)(1) (1988).
98. I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) (1988).
99. I.R.C. § 469(a)(1) (1988).
100. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-IT(f)(4)(B) (as amended in 1992).
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There are exceptions to this limitation. A partner who actively partici-
pates in a rental real estate activity may deduct up to $25,000 of the passive
loss.' 0' The amount is reduced by one-half of taxpayer's adjusted gross
income in excess of $100,000.2 Thus, for taxpayers with adjusted gross
incomes greater than $150,000, this exception disappears.
A taxpayer is permitted to deduct the aggregate amount of prior
undeducted passive losses upon the taxable disposition of the entire interest
in the activity.103 The amount deductible is limited to the amount of loss
generated by the activity. This requires the taxpayer to keep track of all
passive activity loss carry-forwards separately for each activity. This excep-
tion was- enacted based on the theory that it is possible to compute real
economic gains and losses upon disposition of the complete investment in
a passive activity.
If the passive activity loss is generated by a publicly traded partnership
that is not treated as a corporation because of its qualifying income, the
loss can only offset passive income from the same partnership.'04 In effect,
losses from publicly traded partnerships are nondeductible.
Following the enactment of the limitations under Code section 469, the
Treasury issued final revised regulations under Code section 752 in 1991.105
The philosophy behind these regulations is that liabilities should be allocated
to the partner who will ultimately bear the economic burden of repaying
the liability. As a result, the misallocations that occurred in Raphan are
avoided. Although the current regulations are much more complicated than
the ones they replaced, they reflect the economic realities of the partnership
more accurately.
It was hoped that these new regulations would remove the need for
special limitations on the deductibility of partnership losses beyond that
contained in Code section 704(d). The hope was naive. As long as nonre-
course debt generates basis, changing its allocation will not prevent someone
from deducting losses in excess of economic risk. The question now becomes,
are there excess losses of such magnitude to justify the extreme complexity
involved in sections 465 and 469 and their interrelationship?'1 6 The answer
is no. Over the past seven years numerous layers of complexity have been
enacted to prevent avoidance through tax shelters. These provisions included
but are not limited to extended depreciation lives, 0 7 a significantly strength-
ened alternative minimum tax,1e8 and an economic performance requirement
101. I.R.C. § 469(i) (1988).
102. I.R.C. § 469(i)(3) (1988).
103. I.R.C. § 469(g) (1988).
104. I.R.C. § 469(k) (1988).
105. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-0 to -5 (1991).
106. There is also a question about the effect of these provisions on different industries.
Congress is currently considering repealing Code section 469 as it relates to real estate either
as a stimulus or to correct an excess burden placed on this industry. ADmnmSTRAroN's
PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 21-22.
107. I.R.C. § 168 (Supp. 1993).
108. I.R.C. §§ 55-58 (1988).
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to accrued expenses. 1°9 Although these provisions do not eliminate all tax
shelter benefits, they do restrict them severely. Congress could probably
repeal Code section 465 without affecting government revenue significantly
because of the existence of Code section 469. Alternatively, Congress could
repeal Code section 469. However, it is unrealistic to expect a repeal of
either section 465 or section 469 in the short run. Any loss of revenue is
by definition significant to a Congress trying desperately to reduce the
deficit without drastically cutting spending.
C. Distributions and Dispositions
Generally, the sale or exchange of a partnership interest is governed by
the entity concept. The seller recognizes capital gain or loss"0 and the
purchaser has a cost basis in the acquired interest.' This approach to
dispositions provides a tax avoidance potential. To the extent that the
appreciation in the value of the interest is attributable to unrealized ordinary
income within the partnership, the selling partner has converted ordinary
income into capital gains. To prevent this abuse, Congress enacted Code
section 751(a).
Code section 751(a) provides that to the extent the proceeds from the
sale or exchange of a partnership interest are attributable to either unrealized
receivables or substantially appreciated inventory, the transaction shall be
treated as the sale of a noncapital asset. The seller will recognize ordinary
income. The remainder of the transaction will be governed by the general
rule providing capital gains and losses. In other words, section 751(a)
bifurcates the transaction into a part sale of ordinary income property and
a part sale of a capital asset.
An unrealized receivable is any amount due from the sale of goods or
performance of services that has been earned but not yet recognized by the
partnership under its accounting method." 2 Normally this refers to the
accounts receivable of a cash method, partnership. Unrealized receivables
also include recaptures of amounts taxable under provisions such as Code
sections 1245 and 1250."1
Inventory includes items for sale in the 'ordinary course of the partner-
ship's business."14 Any other item which would generate ordinary income if
sold by the partnership"' and any item that would generate ordinary income
if sold by the partner"16 are also included in the definition of inventory.
109. I.R.C. §§ 461(h) (Supp. 1993).
110. I.R.C. § 741 (1988). It is important to remember that the sale price includes the
reduction in liabilities under Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
111. I.R.C. § 742 (1988).
112. I.R.C. § 751(c) (1988).
113. I.R.C. § 751(c)(2) (1988).
114. I.R.C. § 751(d)(2)(A) (1988).
115. I.R.C. § 751(d)(2)(B) (1988).
116. I.R.C. § 751(d)(2)(D) (1988).
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To be substantially appreciated, the inventory must meet two tests.
First, the fair market value of the inventory must exceed 120%V0 of the
adjusted basis of the property. 1 7 In addition, the value of the inventory
must exceed 10% of the value of all of the partnership's assets except
cash."' Cash was omitted from this second test to prevent avoidance of the
application of the section 751 rules by stuffing the partnership with cash
immediately before the transaction. This cash could then be withdrawn after
the transaction without recognizing any income under section 731.
Viewed solely from the perspective of the 'selling partner, the rules are
logical. They replace the entity concept with the aggregate concept. The
vendor is treated as selling his or her share of each partnership asset. This
preserves the tax character of each asset. It prevents conversion of ordinary
income into capital gains. It nullifies any potential benefit that could be
derived from contributing property in anticipation of the sale of the interest.
Viewed from the perspective of the purchaser, the rules break down.
Although the purchaser has paid fair market value for his or her share of
the assets, the inside basis does not change. Therefore, upon the subsequent
sale or disposition of the assets by the partnership, the appreciation which
was already taxed to the seller will be taxed again to the purchaser. Granted,
the purchaser will receive an increase in outside basis for this income." 9
However, this will not benefit the purchaser until a subsequent disposition
of the interest. The reduced gain on this second sale of the interest, or the
realized loss, cannot offset the prior excess income because of the absence
of any present value computation to take into account the time value of
money. In addition, the double counted income is likely to be reported as
ordinary income, whereas the later offset is likely to be a reduced capital
gain or capital loss. Given the rate differentials, these will not balance.
Congress recognized the inequity of this situation by providing the Code
section 754 election to the partnership. 20 If the partnership so elects, it can
adjust the inside basis of its assets. The adjustment will increase or decrease
the basis of the asset by the difference between what the purchaser paid
for his or her share of the asset and the existing basis of that share.' 2 ' The
adjustment is solely for the benefit of the purchasing partner.' 22 The result
is that each partnership asset has two bases-one for the continuing partners
and one for the purchasing partner. In the extreme, each asset could have
as many different bases as the partnership has partners. 2 3 The recordkeeping
requirements in this situation are a nightmare.
117. I.R.C. § 751(d)(1)(A) (1988).
118. I.R.C. § 751(d)(1)(B) (1988).
119. I.R.C. § 705 (1988).
120. I.R.C. § 754 (1988).
121. I.R.C. § 743 (1988).
122. I.R.C. § 743(b) (1988).
123. This would only occur if the sales of the interest were structured such that none of
them terminated the partnership under Code section 708.
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The section 754 election is made at the partnership's level, not the
partner's level. In addition it can only be revoked with permission of the
IRS. As a consequence, not all partnerships wish to make the election, nor
can a purchasing partner require that it be made. The result is an inequity
between the selling and purchasing partners.
Distributions from a partnership are even more complex. The general
rules are that no gain or loss is recognized by either the partnership'2 or
the partner' 25 as a result of the distribution, and that the recipients take a
carryover basis in the assets. 126 These general rules have exceptions for the
recognition of gain if excess cash is distributed, 27 for the recognition of
loss if the distribution terminates the partner's interest,'7 and for substituted
basis. 2 9 In cases of distributions that terminate the partner's interest, the
rules are further complicated by the requirement that the distribution be
divided between the amount received in exchange for the partner's interest
and the amount received as taxable ordinary income. 30
Congress was concerned that the rules did not prevent the shifting of
income among partners and the conversion of ordinary income into capital
gains. Therefore, they enacted a provision that reclassifies a disproportionate
distribution into a part distribution-part sale.' These rules border on the
unintelligible. Worse, they fail to prevent the types of abuses that Congress
sought to eliminate.3 2 Even in those cases in which the rules work, there
are likely to be inequities because of gain or loss recognition or basis
limitation. In these cases, the partnership can elect to make an adjustment
to the inside basis of its asset similar to the adjustment in the case of a
sale."' This adjustment is difficult and in certain cases inaccurate. 3 4 The
combination of all these rules creates a situation in which it is almost
impossible to correctly report the tax result of a distribution.
Both the disposition and distribution rules could stand improvement.
However, it is not likely that the disposition rules will be changed. They
work reasonably well as is. They minimize the shifting of income or the
conversion of ordinary income into capital gains.
Distributions are different. The rules do not work. Therefore, they
should be changed to make them more manageable and consistent. The real
question is how. A simple solution is to repeal the anti-abuse provisions of
Code section 751(b). There is likely to be objection to this suggestion on
124. I.R.C. § 731(b) (Supp. 1993).
125. I.R.C. § 731(a) (1988).
126. I.R.C. § 732 (1988).
127. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (1988).
128. I.R.C. § 731(b) (Supp. 1993).
129. I.R.C. § 732(a)(2) and (b) (1988).
130. I.R.C. § 736 (1988).
131. I.R.C. § 751(b) (1988).
132. For a corfiplete discussion of the purpose of the anti-abuse rules and why they do
not work, see McKEE ET AL., supra note 69, at 21.01 [2], 21-4 to 21-8.
133. I.R.C. §§ 754, 734 (1988).
134. See McKEE ET AL., supra note 69, at 25.02, 25-11 to 25-12.
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the grounds that this will open too wide a loophole. I disagree. First, the
current rules do not prevent the abuses; therefore, there is no reason to
maintain them. Second, and more importantly, there are other safeguards
in place. For example, the new section 704(c) regulations prevent the shifting
of income both on contribution of property and, under the "reverse (c)"
rules, on the contribution of cash. The revision of Code section 707(a)(2)(B)
and the enactment of Code section 737 prevent distribution as well as
possible disguised sales from avoiding taxation as a contribution. Code
sections 724 and 735 prevent both contributions and distributions from
converting ordinary income property into capital assets. Given all of these
other rules there is very little need for a rule such as section 751(b). Its
repeal will go a long way to returning rationality into partnership taxation.
There are other ways to change the distribution provisions.'" Many of
them would replace the existing rules with other highly complex rules. 13 6
Given the restricted abuse potential, these proposals should be anialyzed
with the view to preventing the creation of cures which are worse than the
disease.
D. The Future
The Treasury should be reasonable in its interpretation of Revenue
Procedure 93-27 and thereby eliminate the questions surrounding the receipt
of a profits interest for services. Further, Congress should repeal the complex
at-risk rules of Code section 469-the other layers of loss limitations are
enough. Moreover, Congress should mandate Code section 754 treatment
to alleviate the inequity between sellers and purchasing partners. Finally,
Congress should repeal Code section 751(b) to allow consistent and rational
treatment of distributions.
CONCLUSION
Recently, there has been renewed interest in partnership taxation. It has
taken the form of a review of existing rules as well as suggestions for
improvement and change. 3 7 As with all suggestions, it has proved impossible
to meet the conflicting policy goals of simplicity, equity, neutrality and
revenue protection. There have been trade-offs, which has been the history
of taxation.
From the very beginning, partnership taxation has been unique in trying
to blend the alternative concepts of the entity and aggregate theories. As a
consequence, there is no one theory that can be applied to reason out an
135. See Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Contributions and Distributions, 47
TAx L. REv. 173 (1991).
136. See John P. Steines, Jr., Commentary-Unneeded Reform, 47 TAx L. R-v. 239
(1991).
137. See, e.g., Partnership Taxation Symposium, 47 TAx LAW Ray. (1991); Sheldon I.
Banoff, Guaranteed Payments for the Use of Capital: Schizophrenia in Subchapter K, 70
TAxEs 820 (1992).
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answer. This conflict will not be resolved. What we can reasonably expect
is a continuing determination of the taxation of individual transactions.
The two possibilities that will have the most beneficial effect on future
partnership taxation are outside Subchapter K. They are the expansion of
Subchapter S and the integration of corporate and individual taxation. Both
will reduce the pressure on business to operate in partnership form when
the corporate structure is better suited. In the present environment of tax
change, Congress should not ignore Subchapter K, but should revise the
tax treatment of partnerships in a manner that advances the policy goals
of easing complexity and promoting operational rationality.

